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RAWLS' CONCEPT OF REFLECTIVE 
EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS ORIGINAL FUNCTION 
IN A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
JOHN MIKHAIL* 
John Rawls' concept of reflective equilibrium' has been the 
subject of considerable interest and debate. Its use in moral 
philosophy has drawn criticism from many philosophers and legal 
scholars2 and has been resourcefully defended by others.3 Rawls' 
concept originally derived from an influential account of the 
philosophical method of justifying principles of inductive 
inference.4 As such, many commentators have assumed that the 
concept implies a close nexus between the methods of ethics and 
empirical science, and thus may shed light on the nature of moral 
truth, justification, and objectivity.5 Reflective equilibrium also 
plays a significant role in the analogy Rawls draws in A Theory of 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Essay is a slightly 
modified and expanded version of the discussion of reflective equilibrium that 
appears in my doctoral dissertation on Rawls' linguistic analogy. See infra note 
19. I wish to thank the editors of the Washington University Jurisprudence 
Review for the valuable opportunity to publish this version in their journal and 
for their excellent editorial work in bringing the Essay to publication. Thanks 
also to the many scholars who, over the course of nearly two decades, have 
helped to improve my understanding of reflective equilibrium and its original 
function in A Theory of Justice, including most prominently David Brink, Noam 
Chomsky, Tom Grey, Gilbert Harman, Terry Irwin, Christine Korsgaard, David 
Lyons, Matthias Mahlmann, Richard Miller, John Rawls, Henry Richardson, 
Tim Scanlon, Phillipe Schlenker, Peter Singer, Larry Solum, Liz Spelke, Jason 
Stanley, Nicholas Sturgeon, Josh Tenenbaum, Alec Walen, Leif Wenar, and 
Allen Wood. Finally, I wish to thank Sean Kellem for his outstanding assistance 
in helping me to prepare this Essay for publication. 
I See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-22,46-53 (1971). 
2See, e.g., RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
(1999); R. M. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL 
STUDIES ON RAWLS' `A THEORY OF JUSTICE' 81-107 (Norman Daniels ed., 
1989) [hereinafter READING RAWLS]; Peter Singer, Sidgwick and Reflective 
Equilibrium, 58 THE MONIST 490 (1974). 
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Joseph Raz, 
The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium, 25 INQUIRY 307 (1982). 
4 See NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST (1955; paperback, 
1983). 
5 See, e.g., DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS 
(1989); Richard Boyd, how to Be a Moral Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL 
REALISM 181-228 (G. Sayre-McCord ed., 1988). 
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Justice between moral theory and generative linguistics.6 The 
linguistic analogy has been a source of intense controversy in its 
own right and has led to further speculation about whether Rawls 
considers moral theory to be an empirical discipline—a branch of 
psychology—and, if so, whether its claims to normative authority 
can be maintained.7 
Unfortunately, scholarly discussions of reflective equilibrium 
often proceed as if there were a single, uniform notion going under 
this name. This assumption is mistaken. Rawls' original 
explanation of how to reconcile the descriptive and normative 
aspects of moral theory in his early article, Outline of a Decision 
Procedure for Ethics8 (hereinafter Outline), differs significantly 
from the account of the same problem offered in A Theory of 
Justice, differences that go well beyond the absence of the term 
"reflective equilibrium" in the former article. Moreover, Rawls' 
two detailed accounts of reflective equilibrium in Sections 4 and 9 
of A Theory of Justice are themselves dissimilar in certain respects, 
although Rawls does not call attention to these differences. Further 
complicating matters is the distinction Rawls draws implicitly in 
Section 9 of A Theory of Justice, and explicitly in The 
Independence of Moral Theory9 (hereinafter Independence), 
between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. In a pair of 
important articles published over thirty years ago, Norman Daniels 
supplied a detailed treatment of this distinction as a means of 
responding on Rawls' behalf to the criticisms of philosophers such 
as R. M. Hare, Peter Singer, and Richard Brandt.1° Yet although 
Daniels' interpretations of this distinction are often taken to be 
authoritative, there appear to be significant discrepancies between 
the original distinction Rawls draws between narrow and wide 
reflective equilibrium in both A Theory of Justice and 
6 See generally RAWLS, supra note 1, at 46-51,491. 
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 3; BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE 
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 93-119 (1985); Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82 
PHIL. REV. 220 (1973), reprinted in READING RAwLS, supra note 2, at 1-16; 
Hare, supra note 2; Raz, supra note 3; Singer, supra note 2. 
8 John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177 
(1951). 
9 John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, 48 PROCEEDINGS AND 
ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 5 (1975). 
l° See Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in 
Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979); Norman Daniels, On Some Methods of Ethics and 
Linguistics, 37 PHIL. STUD. 21 (1980). Both articles are reprinted in Daniels' 
book, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). 
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Independence and the account Daniels offers of the same 
distinction. 
The guiding idea of this Essay is that carefully distinguishing 
Rawls' different accounts and uses of reflective equilibrium in his 
early writings may help to clarify some of the debates that this 
concept subsequently generated in the philosophy and 
jurisprudence literatures. Indeed, I suspect that many of the 
interpretive controversies surrounding A Theory of Justice—for 
example, whether Rawls' theory is properly understood to be a 
type of moral anthropology;11 whether Rawls is a subjectivist 12 or 
intuitionist13 
 about morality; whether reflective equilibrium 
represents a discovery procedure or a construction procedure;14 
whether the ultimate justification of Rawls' two principles of 
justice is coherentist or contractualist;15 and whether Rawls is 
committed to a coherence theory of moral truth16—may appear 
different once Rawls' varied and sometimes inconsistent accounts 
of reflective equilibrium are teased apart and examined. 
A comprehensive treatment of the role played by reflective 
equilibrium in Rawls' early writings might begin by carefully 
examining how Rawls conceives of the relationship between the 
problems of descriptive and normative adequacy in his PhD 
Dissertation, A Study of the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge'?  
(hereinafter Grounds), focusing on how Rawls conceives the 
structure of an ethical theory in Grounds to be comprised of two 
main parts: explication and justification. One might then turn to 
Rawls' remarks in Outline about constructing a decision procedure 
for ethics, trying to assess the exact aim of his enterprise there, and 
focusing on how he treats explication both as an empirical inquiry 
and as best compared to the study of inductive logic. Ideally, one 
would also examine Nelson Goodman's classic account of 
induction, to which Rawls refers when first explaining the meaning 
of reflective equilibrium in A Theory of Justice.18 In doing so, one 
might pay particularly close attention to Goodman's explanation of 
why philosophical attempts to provide a logical justification of 
I I Hare, supra note 2. 
12 Singer, supra note 2. 
13 BRANDT, supra note 2. 
14 
u
rs WORKIN, supra note 3. 
15 See, e.g., David Lyons, The Nature and Soundness of the Contract and 
Coherence Arguments, in READING RAWLS, supra note 2, at 141-167. 
16 BRINK, supra note 5. 
17 John Rawls, A Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge: Considered with 
Reference to Judgments on the Moral Worth of Character (1950) (unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author). 
18 See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 20. 
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induction are permanently unsuccessful—hence why philosophers 
should relax the distinction between justifying induction and 
describing ordinary inductive practice—and consider its relevance 
for Rawls' conception of moral theory. Finally, one might also take 
up the multiple references to both reflective equilibrium and 
justification in A Theory of Justice and Rawls' other early writings 
and compare them with the concepts of reflective equilibrium and 
justification presupposed by Rawls' critics, in order to discover 
whether any of the controversies surrounding these concepts may 
be recast, or may simply dissolve upon closer analysis. 
A comprehensive discussion of this type goes beyond the scope 
of this Essay.I9  Instead, my aim here is more modest: to explain the 
meaning and original function of reflective equilibrium in A 
Theory of Justice. To accomplish this objective, I first briefly 
clarify the technical nature of this concept and then summarize the 
main contractual argument of Rawls' influential book (Part I). 
Next, I explain the meaning and function of reflective equilibrium 
in Sections 4 and 9 of A Theory of Justice, calling attention to 
several apparent and previously unnoticed differences between 
these two distinct accounts (Part II). I then discuss the distinction 
Rawls draws implicitly in A Theory of Justice and explicitly in 
Independence between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium 
(Part III). Finally, I discuss and criticize Daniels' influential 
interpretation of the latter distinction, making plain the differences 
between Daniels' deliberately non-psychological account of wide 
reflective equilibrium and Rawls' own partly psychological 
account (Part IV). Throughout the Essay, my primary purpose is 
careful exegesis and analysis of what Rawls actually says about 
reflective equilibrium in A Theory of Justice and Independence. 
This effort is a necessary first step in clarifying many of the 
philosophical and jurisprudential debates that have surrounded the 
meaning and function of this concept, as well as many debates 
about the aims, scope, and authority of moral philosophy more 
generally during the past four decades. 
19 For one effort in this direction, see generally JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF 
MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS' LINGUISTIC ANALOGY AND THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT (forthcoming, Cambridge Univ. 
Press); see also John Mikhail, Rawls' Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the 
'Generative Grammar' Model of Moral Theory Described by John Rawls in 'A 
Theory of Justice' (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Mikhail, Rawls' Linguistic Analogy]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol3/iss1/2
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I. THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
AND THE MAIN CONTRACTUAL ARGUMENT OF A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 
The first and perhaps most important thing to notice about 
reflective equilibrium is that it is not a term of ordinary language, 
but an invented, technical term—a term of art in the traditional 
sense. Like all invented terms, therefore, it has whatever meaning 
its author gives it. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defines reflective 
equilibrium in Sections 4 and 9 and mentions it in passing on only 
four other occasions.20 He also briefly clarifies its meaning in 
Independence. Despite these explicit definitions, it is not 
uncommon in the literature on Rawls to find commentators 
investing reflective equilibrium with new and unwarranted 
meanings of their own. Among Rawls' early commentators, R.M. 
Hare, Ronald Dworkin, Peter Singer, and Norman Daniels appear 
to fall into this pattern quite frequently, although many other 
writers do so as well. 
Reflective equilibrium makes its first appearance in Section 4 
of A Theory of Justice, where it is defined as a hypothetical state of 
affairs that is reached in the course of attempting to justify the 
original position by resolving expected discrepancies between our 
considered judgments and the principles yielded by a candidate 
description of the initial situation. In Rawls' theory, original 
position, considered judgments, and initial situation are also 
technical terms. Accordingly, the Section 4 definition of reflective 
equilibrium cannot be understood without a clear grasp of the 
meanings of these concepts. For the latter purpose, a brief 
summary of the main, contractual argument of A Theory of Justice 
is required. 
Rawls' main contractual argument in A Theory of Justice may 
be understood, for our purposes at any rate,2I as an attempt to 
propose and defend a specific solution to the problem of normative 
adequacy (that is, the problem of which moral principles are 
justified) that is a viable alternative to utilitarianism and 
intuitionism. Rawls characterizes his proposal as a "workable and 
systematic moral conception"22 that is implicit in the contract 
20 See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 20, 48-51, 120, 432, 434, 579. 
21 Rawls' complete argument in A Theory of Justice is rich and complicated, and 
the brief summary offered here is thus selective in its points of emphasis. Many 
important themes and distinctions are ignored. My aim is merely to present a 
suitably clear picture of the essentials of the book's theoretical structure, primarily 
as they pertain to the meaning and function of reflective equilibrium. 
22 RAW 3S, supra note 1, at viii. 
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tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. As compared with its two 
main rivals, it better "approximates our considered judgments of 
justice"23 and "constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a 
democratic society."24 
Like moral conceptions generally, a conception of justice 
enunciates a set of rules or procedures by which ethical questions 
are to be answered and ethical disputes resolved. What singles out 
a conception of justice, according to Rawls, are the kinds of 
questions and disputes that fall under its jurisdiction. In its widest 
sense, justice is ascribed not only to laws, institutions, and social 
systems, including those within and among nation-states, but also 
to particular actions, attitudes, and dispositions of individual 
persons. Rawls, however, limits the scope of his inquiry to a 
conception of social justice. Human society, which is "a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage," produces by its 
collaborative effort a net surplus of advantages and benefits.25 A 
conception of social justice provides a set of principles "for 
choosing among the various social arrangements which determine 
this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on 
the proper distributive shares."26 
Rawls distinguishes various conceptions of justice from the 
concept of justice, the latter of which may be thought of as 
"specified by the role which . . . these different conceptions[] have 
in common."27 From the concept of justice it is possible to derive 
certain substantial requirements that just institutional arrangements 
must satisfy, for example, that "no arbitrary distinctions are made 
between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties" and 
that "the rules determine a proper balance between competing 
claims to the advantages of social life."28 However, the mere 
concept of justice leaves important questions unsettled, such as 
how to interpret the notions of an arbitrary distinction and a proper 
balance. For these, a particular conception of justice is required. 
Rawls narrows his topic in two more fundamental respects. 
First, he focuses on a special case of the problem of justice, which 
he calls "the primary subject of justice" or the "basic structure of 
society."29 This problem concerns how the major social 
institutions the political constitution and the primary economic 
" Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 4. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 Id.  
71 Id. at 7. 
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and social arrangements—should assign basic rights and duties and 
determine the division of the advantages of social cooperation. 
Second, Rawls limits his attention to ideal rather than non-ideal 
theory. Thus, he seeks principles that would govern a "well-
ordered society," which is designed to advance the good of its 
members and to be regulated by a public and publicly accepted 
conception of justice.3°  
Rawls' main argument in A Theory of Justice may be 
characterized, then, as an argument for a particular conception of 
social justice, the principles of which are to answer moral 
questions and resolve moral disputes about the basic structure of a 
well-ordered society. The complete argument is complex and 
includes numerous idealizations and simplifying devices. One 
guiding idea, borrowed from social contract theory, is nonetheless 
straightforward. Rawls' proposed conception of justice is not 
deduced from a presumed self-evident or a priori proposition, nor 
is it arrived at by an analysis of moral concepts or of the meanings 
of ethical terms. Instead, its principles are the object of a rational 
choice made by persons in a hypothetical contractual arrangement, 
and the fact that certain principles and not others would be chosen 
under such an arrangement constitutes at least one argument for 
their being a solution to the problem of normative adequacy. 
Rawls' contract argument, as Lyons usefully labels it,31  
consists of two parts: first, a characterization of an initial 
contractual arrangement, and second, a conception of justice that 
would be chosen in that situation. As Rawls observes, the two parts 
are logically independent. It is possible to object to one part and 
not the other. Thus, one might reject the particular conditions and 
constraints Rawls imposes on the initial contractual situation, or 
alternatively, one might accept Rawls' characterization of the 
initial situation but argue that the principles he derives from it are 
invalid.32 
The bulk of A Theory of Justice is devoted to working out and 
defending a solution to the choice problem presented by this 
3° Id. at 4-5, 8-9. Like reflective equilibrium, ideal theory and non-ideal theory 
are terms of art for Rawls. His fullest explanation of them in A Theory of Justice 
may be found in Sections 39 and 53. Ideal theory assumes strict compliance with 
the principles of justice and seeks to determine the principles that would 
characterize a well-ordered society under these and other favorable 
circumstances. By contrast, non-ideal theory assumes partial compliance and 
considers which principles of justice to adopt and apply in these and other less 
favorable circumstances, taking up such subjects as just war theory and the duty 
to comply with unjust laws. See generally id. at 8-9, 245-6, 351. 
31 See Lyons, supra note 15, at 150. 
32 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 15, 54. 
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contractual arrangement. As is well known, the conception of 
justice he advocates comes in two forms, one general and one more 
specific. The two principles of the specific conception—what 
Rawls calls the special conception of justice—are as follows: 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of basic liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for al1.33  
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.34 
To understand the contract argument for the special conception 
of justice, it is important to explain some terminology that Rawls 
employs in connection with the first part of the argument. Rawls 
draws a fundamental distinction between the idea of an initial 
contractual arrangement and of particular interpretations of it. The 
former, which Rawls names the initial situation, may be thought of 
as a common feature of contract views generally. The initial 
situation, in turn, admits of many possible interpretations, each of 
which gains expression in the form of a set of conditions and 
constraints imposed there. These usually include a description of 
the contracting parties, such as their motives and nature, the extent 
to which they are rational, their knowledge of themselves, and so 
on. It also includes a general description of their deliberative 
circumstances, such as the historical information available to them 
and the formal constraints under which they deliberate.35  
The name that Rawls gives to his own preferred interpretation 
of the initial situation is the original position. Among its most 
salient features are the following. Most famously, the parties in the 
original position are presumed to operate behind a "veil of 
ignorance" that temporarily prevents them from knowing their 
identities, their natural talents and skills, their conception of the 
good, and their social circumstances generally. The deliberators 
do, however, possess full knowledge of all the general facts and 
33 Id at 250. 
34 Id. at 83. 
35 /d. at 18, 121. 
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scientific laws relevant to the determination of principles of justice 
they must make.36 Moreover, they are presumed to be rational 
insofar as they are able to choose the most effective means to given 
ends and—despite the absence of information about their particular 
ends—to rank their alternative ends self-interestedly in accordance 
with a postulated preference for more, rather than less, primary 
social goods.37 They are also presumed to be mutually 
disinterested.38  
A number of other important features characterize the original 
position as well. For instance, one of the objective circumstances 
of the parties is moderate scarcity: demand outruns supply, and 
resources are neither abundant enough to make cooperation 
superfluous, nor scarce enough to make it futile.39 As for candidate 
principles presented to the parties, they must meet certain formal 
requirements even to be eligible for consideration. Rawls arranges 
these requirements under five headings: generality, universality, 
publicity, order, and finality. Taken conjointly, these five 
conditions exclude several variants of egoism as serious candidates 
for a suitable conception of justice. However, the traditional 
versions of utilitarianism and intuitionism do satisfy these 
conditions, and hence these formal constraints do not prejudge the 
issue between Rawls' theory and its main rivals.40 Finally, Rawls 
assumes that it is rational for the parties in the original position to 
adopt a "maximin" rule, which instructs them to prefer principles 
whose worst possible outcome is superior to that of alternative 
principles.41  
According to Rawls, the original position is "the most 
philosophically favored interpretation" of the initial situation.42 By 
this he means that the restrictions imposed on the initial situation 
are more reasonable and widely accepted than any alternative set 
of conditions, not only from the standpoint of rational choice but 
also from the standpoint of moral theory. In other words, the 
conditions and constraints embodied in the original position are not 
only reasonable, but they are also morally defensible in that "the 
principles that would be chosen, whatever they turn out to be, are 
acceptable from a moral point of view."43 The original position 
36 Id. at 136-38. 
37 Id. at 14,142-43. 
38 Id. at 13,127. 
39 Id. at 127. 
46 Id at 130-36. 
41 Id. at 152-53. 
42 Id at 18,122. 
43 Id. at 120. 
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thus constitutes a model of what Rawls calls pure procedural 
justice: the principles it generates are normatively valid principles 
of justice because they are the outcome of a procedure that has 
been characterized in such a way as to give them moral force." In 
particular, the initial situation is interpreted so as to respect the 
freedom, equality, and rational self-interest of the contracting 
parties. This feature of the original position is captured by the 
name Rawls gives to his conception of justice: justice as fairness. 
It conveys the idea that the principles of justice are the product of 
an agreement that is itself fair.45  
It is this aspect of procedural fairness that is thought to lend the 
original position its justifying force. Rawls contends that the 
intuitively fair and plausible nature of the conditions and 
constraints embodied in the original position constitutes a 
provisional justification of the set of principles chosen by the 
people occupying that position.46 The justification is only 
provisional because there is more to establishing the procedural 
fairness of the original position than showing that the conditions 
imposed there seem fair and reasonable. Additionally, one defends 
the fairness of a particular interpretation of the initial contractual 
situation by determining whether 
the principles which would be chosen match our 
considered convictions of justice or extend them in 
an acceptable way. We can note whether applying 
these principles would lead us to make the same 
judgments about the basic structure of society 
which we now make intuitively and in which we 
have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases 
where our present judgments are in doubt and given 
with hesitation, these principles offer a resolution 
which we can affirm on reflection.47  
To test a proposed description of the initial situation, then, we 
measure the consequences of its principles against our 
pretheoretical moral intuitions about the basic structure of society 
as it applies to particular cases or controversies. The intuitions in 
question are what Rawls calls "our considered convictions of 
justice," that is, those judgments "we now make intuitively and in 
44 Id. at 85, 136. 
45 Id. at I 1-12, 136. 
46 Id. at 18. 
47 Id at 19. 
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which we have the greatest confidence."48 If, on reflection, the 
principles chosen in the contractual situation can be shown to 
cohere with our considered judgments about these same cases, then 
we possess further evidence of the fairness of our proposed 
interpretation of the initial situation and further grounds for having 
satisfied the requirements of pure procedural justice. 
II. THE MEANING OF REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 
Thus far I have not said anything specific about how reflective 
equilibrium fits into this picture. It first enters Rawls' discussion in 
Section 4 in the explicit service of the contract argument, as a state 
of affairs that is reached in the course of resolving expected 
discrepancies between our considered judgments and the principles 
generated by a candidate description of the initial situation, in an 
effort to justify the original position. Later, in Section 9, Rawls 
characterizes reflective equilibrium somewhat differently, not 
merely as a state of affairs achieved in the course of justifying the 
original position, but also as a state of affairs that results after a 
person has been given the opportunity to evaluate and reflect on 
competing theoretical descriptions of her sense of justice and has 
either revised her initial judgments or held fast to them. 
Significantly, Rawls does not emphasize the difference between 
these two accounts of reflective equilibrium. Instead, the Section 9 
account is presented as if it were a resumption and elaboration of 
the earlier discussion in Section 4. Yet, as we shall see, there 
appear to be at least superficial differences between these two 
accounts. 
A. The Section 4 Account of Reflective Equilibrium 
We can begin to understand the Section 4 account of reflective 
equilibrium by recognizing the role that this concept plays in 
support of the contract argument. According to the contract 
argument, the two principles of justice are justified because the! 
would be chosen in a suitably characterized contractual situation. 9 
This justificatory strategy, as we have seen, is procedural: in the 
absence of an independent criterion for justice, we construct a 
procedure whose fairness ensures an outcome that is likewise just 
" Id. at 19-20. 
49 Id. at I 1, 118-19, 136,579. 
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or fair. The original position is itself justified as the most suitable 
interpretation of the initial situation in two ways: first, by 
grounding its conditions in intuitively plausible and commonly 
shared presumptions, and second, by testing its consequences 
against our considered judgments of justice.5°  
In Section 4, reflective equilibrium is introduced as a state of 
affairs toward which we strive in attempting this second sort of 
justification of a proposed description of the initial situation. 
Presumably, when we test a proposed description, we discover 
discrepancies between our considered judgments, on the one hand, 
and the consequences of the principles generated by the description 
under consideration, on the other. We advance toward reflective 
equilibrium by attempting to resolve these differences. 
Here it is helpful to distinguish our motivation for advancing 
toward reflective equilibrium from our manner of doing so. 
According to Rawls, the reason why we want equilibrium, and why 
we don't simply settle for whichever principles a plausible set of 
contractual conditions generates, is that we may have stronger 
convictions about certain specific issues of social justice than we 
do about what constitutes a fair contractual arrangement. For 
example, consider our firm convictions, which Rawls cites, that 
religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust.51  
Because of the strength of these convictions, we may reasonably 
be sceptical of an otherwise plausible description of the initial 
situation whose consequent principles fail to honor them. If our 
convictions are strong enough, we may go so far as to invalidate 
such a description. Therefore, the method of advancing toward 
reflective equilibrium is to modify either the description or the 
considered judgments, for the latter, like the former, are merely 
provisional fixed points that may be changed. We go back and 
forth like this, sometimes conforming the description to our 
judgments, sometimes our judgments to the description and its 
consequent principles, until at last we "find a description of the 
initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and 
yields principles which match our considered judgments duly 
pruned and adjusted."52 When this happens, reflective equilibrium 
is reached, and the description constitutes a temporarily stable 
conception of the original position. The conception is only 
temporarily stable because, as its name implies, reflective 
equilibrium is a state of affairs that is always subject to further 
s° Id. at 86, 	 136. 
51 Id. at 19. 
52 Id. at 20. 
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reflection and change. Nonetheless, according to Rawls, once the 
state of reflective equilibrium is reached, the claim that the original 
position is the philosophically most favored interpretation of the 
initial situation is then fully justified—both because the constraints 
it imposes are independently plausible and because its principles 
conform to our considered judgments of justice. Since the original 
position is fully justified, by transitivity the principles of justice it 
yields are also justified. Rawls describes the entire process as 
follows: 
In searching for the most favored description of this 
[initial] situation we work from both ends. We 
begin by describing it so that it represents generally 
shared and preferably weak conditions. We then see 
if these conditions are strong enough to yield a 
significant set of principles. If not, we look for 
further premises equally reasonable. But if so, and if 
these principles match our considered convictions 
of justice, then so far well and good. But 
presumably there will be discrepancies. In this case 
we have a choice. We can either modify the account 
of the initial situation or we can revise our existing 
judgments, for even the judgments we take 
provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision. 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the 
conditions of the contractual circumstances, at 
others withdrawing our judgments and conforming 
them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall 
find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields 
principles which match our considered judgments 
duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I 
refer to as reflective equilibrium. It is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and 
judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we 
know to what principles our judgments conform and 
the premises of their derivation. At the moment 
everything is in order. But this equilibrium is not 
necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further 
examination of the conditions which should be 
imposed on the contractual situation and by 
particular cases which may lead us to revise our 
judgments. Yet for the time being we have done 
what we can to render coherent and to justify our 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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convictions of social justice. We have reached a 
conception of the original position.53  
For our purposes, three points about how Rawls characterizes 
reflective equilibrium in this passage are especially worth 
emphasizing. First, reflective equilibrium is not, strictly speaking, 
a "method" or "technique," as Dworkin and other writers 
frequently describe it,54 but rather a state of affairs. Specifically, it 
is the state of affairs that exists once a description of the initial 
situation has been reached "that both expresses reasonable 
conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted."55  
Second, the word "reflective" appears to play the same role in 
Rawls' definition of reflective equilibrium as the word 
"generative" plays in Chomsky's notion of a generative grammar. 
In Chomsky's framework, "generative" simply means "explicit."56 
In other words, a linguistic grammar qualifies as a generative 
grammar when its principles can be explicitly stated by the linguist 
in a format suitable for serving as the premises of a derivation. 
This is essentially the same meaning Rawls assigns to a reflective 
equilibrium. It refers to the fact that once we have found a correct 
description of the initial situation, "we know to what principles our 
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation."57 
Third, Rawls holds that any proposed description of the initial 
situation is merely provisional and open to modification as a result 
of further investigation, hence not necessarily stable. This 
emphasis on the provisional nature of the original position is 
important: it implies that it is always an open question whether the 
initial situation has been accurately characterized and, therefore, 
whether our convictions of social justice are justified. Rawls 
emphasizes the provisional or contingent character of reflective 
equilibrium (understood as the state of affairs that obtains when the 
initial situation has been accurately characterized) throughout 
53 Id. at 20-21. Rawls adds the following footnote to this paragraph, the 
significance of which I return to below: "The process of mutual adjustment of 
principles and considered judgments is not peculiar to moral philosophy. See 
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1955), pp. 65-68, for parallel remarks concerning the 
justification of the principles of deductive and inductive inference." Id. at 20 n.7. 
54 See, e.g., MIKHAIL, supra note 19, at 288-89 (listing nine separate passages in 
Chapter Six of TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY in which Dworkin refers to reflective 
equilibrium as a "technique"). 
55 RAWLS, supra note I , at 20. 
56 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF A THEORY OF SYNTAX 4 (1965). 
57 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 21. 
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Section 4. For example, he says, "there is no point at which an 
appeal is made to self-evidence in the traditional sense either of 
general conceptions or particular convictions" and he elaborates 
this point as follows: 
I do not claim for the principles of justice proposed 
that they are necessary truths or derivable from such 
truths. A conception of justice cannot be deduced 
from self-evident premises or conditions on 
principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the 
mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together into one coherent view. 58  
Rawls' definition of reflective equilibrium in Section 4 can be 
illustrated by means of the simple diagram in Figure 1 below. 
According to Rawls' definition, a reflective equilibrium is the state 
of affairs that is reached when the moral theorist knows the 
principles to which her chosen set of considered judgments (which 
themselves may have changed in the process leading to reflective 
equilibrium) conform, along with the premises of those principles' 
derivation.59 
 When this state of affairs has been reached, the 
theorist has arrived at a conception of the original position. A 
considered judgment is justified when it is derivable from the 
original position. At that point—although not until then—the 
considered judgment may be called a "considered judgment in 
reflective equilibrium." Therefore, if we inquire as to the 
relationship among reflective equilibrium, the justification of 
considered judgments, and the original position, the answer is that 
in Rawls' stated framework, these concepts are merely different 
ways of saying the same thing. 
58 Id. 
59 
 Here I should note that I am taking the liberty of resolving an apparent 
ambiguity in Rawls' definition of reflective equilibrium. Rawls writes: "It is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the 
premises of their derivation." Id. at 20. What is the antecedent of "their" in the 
phrase "their derivation"? If the antecedent is "judgments," then Rawls would be 
saying that a reflective equilibrium is reflective because we know "to what 
principles our judgments conform and the premises of the derivation of those 
judgments," which would appear to be redundant. Hence it seems preferable to 
interpret the intended antecedent of "their" as the principles themselves. On this 
reading Rawls would be saying that a reflective equilibrium is reflective because 
we know "to what principles our judgments conform and, in turn, the premises 
of the derivation of those principles." 
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Figure 1. 	 Schematic Diagram of Rawls' Definition of Reflective 
Equilibrium in Section 4 of A Theory of Justice 
Original Position 
Ravels' Two Principles of Justice 
Considered Judgments 
Reflective Equilibrium 
B. The Section 9 Account of Reflective Equilibrium 
In Section 9, Rawls characterizes reflective equilibrium in 
more elaborate terms. The Section 9 definition is more revealing 
for a number of reasons, perhaps the most significant of which is 
its precise location in Rawls' text. For it is only after comparing 
the problem of descriptive adequacy in ethics with the problem of 
descriptive adequacy in linguistics, and distinguishing moral 
competence and moral performance by identifying considered 
judgments as those judgments in which our moral capacities are 
likely to be displayed without distortion, that Rawls reintroduces 
the notion of reflective equilibrium in Section 9 that he first 
discussed in Section 4. "The need for this idea," Rawls now 
explains, "arises as follows": 
According • to the provisional aim of moral 
philosophy, one might say that justice as fairness is 
the hypothesis that the principles which would be 
chosen in the original position are identical with 
those that match our considered judgments and so 
these principles describe our sense of justice. But 
this interpretation is clearly oversimplified. In 
describing our sense of justice an allowance must be 
made for the likelihood that considered judgments 
are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and 
distortions despite the fact that they are rendered 
under favorable circumstances. When a person is 
presented with an intuitively appealing account of 
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his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies 
various reasonable and natural presumptions), he 
may well revise his judgments to conform to its 
principles even though the theory does not fit his 
existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely 
to do this if he can find an explanation for the 
deviations which undermines his confidence in his 
original judgments and if the conception presented 
yields a judgment which he finds he can now 
accept. From the standpoint of moral philosophy, 
the best account of a person's sense of justice is not 
the one which fits his judgment prior to his 
examining any conception of justice, but rather the 
one which matches his judgments in reflective 
equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one 
reached after a person has weighed various 
proposed conceptions and he has either revised his 
judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to 
his initial convictions (and the corresponding 
conception).6°  
On casual glance, this definition of reflective equilibrium 
seems to repeat the Section 4 definition reviewed earlier. Rawls' 
use of the phrase "As we have seen" in the last sentence of the 
paragraph reinforces this impression. However, the account of 
reflective equilibrium that Rawls provides in this paragraph differs 
from the Section 4 definition in what seem like crucial respects. In 
Section 4, reflective equilibrium is a state of affairs that is reached 
in the course of evaluating proposed interpretations of the initial 
situation and identifying one interpretation, the original position, as 
the most favored. By contrast, in this passage reflective 
equilibrium is a state of affairs that is reached in the course of 
evaluating competing descriptions of the sense of justice. 
Likewise, whereas justice as fairness in Section 4 is the contractual 
thesis that the principles of justice are justified because they are 
chosen in the original position (thereby qualifying as justifiable on 
the basis of the notion of pure procedural justice), here justice as 
fairness is the hypothesis that these same principles describe the 
sense of justice. In short, whereas in Section 4 Rawls appears to be 
discussing the normative problem of justifying principles of 
justice, Rawls' topic in Section 9 appears to be the descriptive 
problem of describing and explaining the sense of justice. 
6° Id. at 48. 
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The apparent discrepancy in the definitions of reflective 
equilibrium that Rawls provides in Sections 4 and 9 raises a 
number of important questions about the significance of his theory 
of justice as a whole. Perhaps the most pressing of these questions 
may be stated as follows. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls certainly 
seems to be defending a solution to the problem of normative 
adequacy. This seems like the only reasonable interpretation of 
many statements he makes throughout the book, such as his 
remarks on the notion of pure procedural justice in Sections 14 and 
20 and his remarks on justification in Sections 4 and 87. Yet Rawls 
also repeatedly describes justice as fairness as a solution to the 
problem of descriptive adequacy. In Section 9, for example, he 
repeatedly explains that the goal of moral theory is to produce an 
accurate description of the sense of justice, which he clearly takes 
to be a particular cognitive capacity of the human mind: 
Now one may think of moral philosophy . . . as 
the attempt to describe our moral capacity; or, in 
the present case, one may regard a theory of justice 
as describing our sense of justice.6t  
A conception of justice characterizes our moral 
sensibility when the everyday judgments we do 
make are in accordance with its principles.62 
Only a deceptive familiarity with our everyday 
judgments and our natural readiness to make them 
could conceal the fact that characterizing our moral 
capacities is an intricate task.63  
There is no reason to assume that our sense of 
justice can be adequately characterized by familiar 
common sense precepts, or derived from the more 
obvious learning principles. A correct account of 
moral capacities will certainly involve principles 
and theoretical constructions which go much 
beyond the norms and standards cited in everyday 
life.64 
61 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
63 Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
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According to the provisional aim of moral 
philosophy, one might say that justice as fairness is 
the hypothesis that the principles which would be 
chosen in the original position are identical with 
those that match our considered judgments and so 
these principles describe our sense of justice.65 
In describing our sense of justice an allowance 
must be made for the likelihood that considered 
judgments are no doubt subject to certain 
irregularities and distortions despite the fact that 
they are rendered under favorable circumstances.66 
[I]f we can describe one person's sense of 
grammar we shall surely know many things about 
the general structure of language. Similarly, if we 
should be able to characterize one (educated) 
person's sense of justice, we would have a good 
beginning toward a theory of justice. We may 
suppose that everyone has in himself the whole form 
of a moral conception.67 
I wish to stress that a theory of justice is 
precisely that, namely, a theory. It is a theory of the 
moral sentiments (to recall an eighteenth century 
title) setting out the principles governing our moral 
powers, or, more specifically, our sense of justice.68 
All of these characterizations of the fundamental goals of 
moral theory in Section 9 imply that those goals are primarily 
descriptive. Moreover, the statements that carry this implication 
are not limited to Section 9. In Section 20, for example, Rawls 
explains that the original position "is not intended to explain 
human conduct except insofar as it tries to account for our moral 
judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of justice."69 
Rawls then adds: "Justice as fairness is a theory of our moral 
sentiments as manifested by our considered judgments in reflective 
equilibrium."70 Therefore, in light of all these characterizations, it 
65 Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
66 Id. (emphasis added). 
67 Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added). 
69 Id. at 120. 
70 id. 
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seems natural to ask whether Rawls' apparently divergent 
objectives in A Theory ofJustice—descriptive and normative—can 
be reconciled, and if so how, and what role the notion of reflective 
equilibrium is supposed to play in this process. 
C. Resolving the Tension: The Function of Reflective 
Equilibrium 
But are Rawls' aims necessarily inconsistent? Richard Brandt, 
R.M. Hare, Peter Singer, and other commentators who have 
criticized Rawls' conception of moral theory for being too 
empirical and insufficiently normative apparently think so. 
Nevertheless, to assume that there must be an irresolvable tension 
between the empirical and normative aspects of Rawls' theory is to 
miss the point of Rawls' reference to Nelson Goodman in Section 
4. The theme of those pages of Fact, Fiction, and Forecast to 
which Rawls directs his reader when he first defines reflective 
equilibrium in Section 4 is the justification of induction. 
Goodman's main point in that discussion is that philosophers 
should be wary of expecting too much from the theory of 
induction. They should stop plaguing themselves with certain 
unanswerable questions about justification and should relax the 
distinction between justifying principles of induction and 
describing ordinary, reliable inductive practice. Summarizing this 
perspective, Goodman writes: 
We no longer demand an explanation for guarantees 
that we do not have, or seek keys to knowledge that 
we cannot obtain. It dawns upon us that the 
traditional smug insistence upon a hard-and-fast line 
between justifying induction and describing 
ordinary inductive practice distorts the problem. 
And we owe belated apologies to Hume. For in 
dealing with the question how normally accepted 
inductive judgments are made, he was in fact 
dealing with the question of inductive validity.7' 
How do Goodman's remarks in this passage bear on Rawls' 
two definitions of reflective equilibrium in Sections 4 and 9? On 
the view I wish to propose, they imply that the tension between 
them is only apparent. There is no necessary inconsistency in 
71 GooDmAN, supra note 4, at 64-65. 
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assuming that a set of moral principles can be part of a solution to 
the problems of empirical and normative adequacy simultaneously. 
To see this point, it helps to examine how Rawls conceives of 
the problem of normative adequacy in diagrammatic form (Figure 
2 below). In A Theory of Justice, Rawls' two principles of justice 
are what he takes to be a solution to the problem of descriptive 
adequacy (with respect to one component of human moral 
competence, namely, the sense of social justice). His contract 
argument is intended to show that these principles would be chosen 
in the original position, thereby proving that they are rational. At 
the same time, Rawls conceives of the original position as 
supplying a provisional solution to the problem of explanatory 
adequacy—the problem of how moral knowledge or the sense of 
justice is acquired72—insofar as it represents an acquisition model 
that helps explain the fact that normal persons possess a sense of 
justice:3 Hence, when Rawls equates justice as fairness both with 
the claim that his two principles would be chosen in the original 
position—thereby being part of a solution to the problem of 
normative adequacy—and with the empirical hypothesis that those 
principles constitute an accurate description and explanation of the 
sense of justice—thereby solving the problems of descriptive and 
explanatory adequacy—he is not necessarily being inconsistent. A 
set of moral principles can, in theory, be descriptive, explanatory, 
and normative simultaneously. Indeed, according to Rawls, this is 
the philosophical idea1.74 It is part of what it means to justify the 
morality of common sense, by showing that it has a rational 
foundation. 
72 
 On the meaning and significance of the problem of explanatory adequacy and 
its application to moral theory, see generally MIKHAIL, supra note 19; Mikhail, 
Rawls' Linguistic Analogy, supra note 19. 
71 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 120 ("The conception of the original position is not 
intended to explain human conduct except insofar as it tries to account for our 
moral judgments and helps to explain our having a sense of justice. Justice as 
fairness is a theory of our moral sentiments as manifested in our considered 
judgments in reflective equilibrium."). 
74 Mustice as fairness can be understood as saying that the two principles 
previously mentioned would be chosen in the original position in preference to 
other traditional conceptions of justice, for example, those of utility and 
perfection; and that these principles give a better match with our considered 
judgments on reflection than these recognized alternatives. Thus justice as 
fairness moves us closer to the philosophical ideal; it does not, of course, 
achieve it." Id. at 49-50. 
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Figure 2. 	 Schematic Diagram of Rawls' Account of the Problem of 














     
Considered Judgments 
It is important to avoid misinterpreting the diagram in Figure 2. 
It is potentially misleading for several interrelated reasons. In the 
first place it fails to take into account the theory-dependence of the 
competence-performance distinction.75 In Section 9, Rawls 
emphasizes that moral theorists may want to change what they 
presently take to be considered judgments once those judgments' 
regulative principles are brought to light. So it is important not to 
be misled by the static appearance of the diagram in Figure 2. A 
reflective equilibrium is not necessarily stable. As its name 
implies, it is always subject to further reflection and change.76 
Second, it is important not to be misled by Rawls' reference to 
Goodman and the problem of justifying induction. It is tempting to 
conclude that just as "[t]he problem of justifying induction is not a 
problem of demonstration but a problem of defining the difference 
between valid and invalid inductions,"77 so too, according to 
Rawls, is the problem of justifying moral principles not something 
over and above the problem of describing or defining what one 
takes, pre-theoretically, to be instances of valid moral reasoning. 
This interpretation of Rawls, however, runs the risk of ignoring an 
important aspect of how he conceives of the problem of normative 
adequacy in ethics, which has no clear analogue in the case of 
either induction or linguistics—namely, the requirement of 
rationality, understood to be the suitability of moral principles as 
75 On the meaning and significance of the competence-performance distinction 
in both linguistics and moral theory, see generally MIKHAIL, supra note 19; 
Mikhail, Rawls' Linguistic Analogy, supra note19. 
76 MIKHAIL, supra note 19, at 20-21; cf Nagel, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
77 GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 65. 
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the object of rational choice. Neither induction nor linguistics 
requires the principles of an adequate theory to be rational in this 
special sense. 
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NARROW AND WIDE 
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
Figure 2 is an oversimplification for a third reason: it fails to 
allow for the possibility that when a person is presented with an 
intuitively appealing account of her sense of justice, her sense of 
justice may itself be transformed as a result of reflecting on this 
account and considering its implications. This is the basis for the 
distinction that Rawls draws between narrow and wide reflective 
equilibrium, which Rawls first explains in the following terms in 
Section 9: 
There are . . . several interpretations of reflective 
equilibrium. For the notion varies depending upon 
whether one is to be presented with only those 
descriptions which more or less match one's 
existing judgments except for minor discrepancies, 
or whether one is to be presented with all possible 
descriptions to which one might plausibly conform 
one's judgments together with all relevant 
philosophical arguments for them. In the first case 
we would be describing a person's sense of justice 
more or less as it is although allowing for the 
smoothing out of certain irregularities; in the second 
case a person's sense of justice may or may not 
undergo a radical shift. Clearly it is the second kind 
of reflective equilibrium that one is concerned with 
in moral philosophy.78  
In this passage, Rawls uses the phrase "second kind of 
reflective equilibrium" to refer to what he calls "wide reflective 
equilibrium" in Independence. By invoking this second kind of 
reflective equilibrium, Rawls makes a reasonable allowance for the 
possibility that when a person is given the opportunity to reflect on 
an empirically adequate theory of her sense of justice, her sense of 
justice may undergo a dramatic shift. Although he does not 
elaborate on this observation to a great extent, its meaning and 
78 RAWLS, supra note I, at 49. 
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motivation seem fairly clear. Rawls' overriding aim in A Theory of 
Justice is not merely to convince his reader that justice as fairness 
is a better overall account of the human sense of justice than 
utilitarianism. He clearly wants to do this, thereby convincing 
those readers previously inclined toward utilitarianism that their 
prior understanding of their own sense of justice may be mistaken. 
Yet he also wishes to leave open the possibility that the act of 
reflecting on a moral theory may cause a person's sense of justice 
to be transformed. Hence, he allows for the possibility that reading 
a book like A Theory of Justice will cause a person whose sense of 
justice is utilitarian to change her mind. 
In Independence, Rawls revisits the distinction between narrow 
and wide reflective equilibrium in an important passage that uses 
the terms "narrow" and "wide" for the first time. First, he 
emphasizes that in attempting to construct an adequate theory of 
the human moral sense or sense of justice, a researcher must be 
careful to distinguish her standpoint as a moral theorist from her 
standpoint as a person applying her own moral beliefs to particular 
moral and social problems: 
In order to [investigate the moral conceptions 
that people hold, or would hold under suitably 
defined conditions], one tries to find a scheme of 
principles that match people's considered 
judgments and general convictions in reflective 
equilibrium. This scheme of principles represents 
their moral conception and characterizes their moral 
sensibility. One thinks of the moral theorist as an 
observer, so to speak, who seeks to set out the 
structure of other people's moral conceptions and 
attitudes. Because it seems likely that people hold 
different conceptions, and the structure of these 
conceptions is in any case hard to delineate, we can 
best proceed by studying the main conceptions 
found in the tradition of moral philosophy and in 
leading representative writers, including their 
discussions of particular moral and social issues. 
We may also include ourselves, since we are ready 
to hand for detailed self-examination. But in 
studying oneself, one must separate one's role as a 
moral theorist from one's role as someone who has 
a particular conception. In the former role we are 
investigating an aspect of human psychology, the 
structure of our moral sensibility; in the latter we 
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are applying a moral conception, which we may 
regard (though not necessarily) as a correct theory 
about what is objectively right and wrong.79 
Two paragraphs later, Rawls reiterates that he conceives of the 
moral theorist as an observer whose aim is to characterize the 
implicit moral beliefs of people in general. He explains the 
meaning of the distinction between narrow and wide reflective 
equilibrium in this context: 
Furthermore, because our inquiry is philosophically 
motivated, we are interested in what conceptions 
people would affirm when they have achieved wide 
and not just narrow reflective equilibrium, an 
equilibrium that satisfies certain conditions of 
rationality. That is, adopting the role of observing 
moral theorists, we investigate what principles 
people would acknowledge and accept the 
consequences of when they have had the 
opportunity to consider other plausible conceptions 
and to assess their supporting grounds. Taking this 
process to the limit, one seeks the conception, or 
plurality of conceptions, that would survive the 
rational consideration of all feasible conceptions 
and all reasonable arguments for them. We cannot, 
of course, actually do this, but we can do what 
seems like the next best thing, namely, to 
characterize the structures of the predominant 
conceptions familiar to us from the philosophical 
tradition, and to work out the further refinements of 
these that strike us as most promising.8°  
The account of the distinction between narrow and wide 
reflective equilibrium given in this passage is virtually identical to 
Rawls' initial account of the same distinction in Section 9 of A 
Theory of Justice. Indeed, there are only two discernible 
differences between the two accounts. First, "considering all 
possible descriptions to which one might plausibly conform one's 
judgments" in Section 9 becomes considering "other plausible 
conceptions" in Independence. Second, considering conceptions of 
justice "together with all relevant philosophical arguments for 
79 Rawls, supra note 9, at 7. 
8() Id. at 8. 
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them" in Section 9 becomes conducting a "philosophically 
motivated" inquiry and searching for an equilibrium that "satisfies 
certain conditions of rationality" by assessing the "supporting 
grounds" of different moral conceptions in Independence. 
Otherwise the two explanations are identical. Thus, we can 
summarize Rawls' original distinction between narrow and wide 
reflective equilibrium as follows. Rawls takes a narrow reflective 
equilibrium to be the state of affairs in which a description of the 
sense of justice that has been selected from a relatively narrow set 
of possible descriptions more or less matches an existing set of 
considered judgments. By contrast, a wide reflective equilibrium 
exists when such a description has been selected from a much 
wider range of alternatives and the individuals in question have 
had the opportunity to consider all relevant philosophical 
arguments in support of those alternatives, whereupon their sense 
of justice may or may not have undergone a radical shift. 
V. DANIELS' REINTERPRETATION OF NARROW AND WIDE 
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
Carefully identifying the differences between the two 
explanations Rawls gives of the distinction between narrow and 
wide reflective equilibrium in A Theory of Justice and 
Independence may seem pedantic or unnecessary. Doing so is 
important, however, because it allows us to formulate a significant 
objection to one of the most influential interpretations of both 
reflective equilibrium and Rawls' linguistic analogy in the 
philosophical literature: namely, that of Norman Daniels.8' 
Daniels' stated objective in his paper, On Some Methods of Ethics 
and Linguistics, is "to free wide equilibrium from an unnecessary 
or, at least, overstated analogy to linguistic method."82 Yet in a 
footnote,83 it becomes apparent that Daniels does not seek to "free" 
moral theory from comparisons to what linguists refer to as E-
language (i.e., externalized) or P-language (i.e., Platonic) 
interpretations of linguistics,"  but only from what linguists refer to 
as I-language (i.e., internalized) interpretations, such as 
81 See generally DANIELS, supra note 10. 
82 Id. at 66. 
83 Id. at 79 n.17. 
84 For a discussion of P-language (i.e., Platonic) interpretations of linguistics, see 
generally JERROLD KATZ, LANGUAGE AND OTHER ABSTRACT OBJECTS (1981). 
See also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 744 (1981) 
(discussing Katz's Platonist interpretation). 
1 
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Chomsky's, in which the subject matter of linguistic theory is an 
aspect of human psychology—a distinctive language faculty that 
exists "inside the head." Thus, in his footnote Daniels explains that 
his criticism of the linguistic analogy is "restricted to approaches to 
syntactics that view it as a branch of psychology, broadly 
construed. These are the approaches Rawls has in mind in 
proposing the analogy, but alternative approaches, such as the one 
indicated in Jerrold Katz's recent work, reject the psychologizing 
of linguistics."85 
Daniels' main claim in his paper is that it is "wide equilibrium . 
. . not narrow, that is of interest to the moral philosopher—and for 
just those reasons that distinguish it from syntactics."86 
Significantly, however, Daniels characterizes these two forms of 
reflective equilibrium differently than Rawls does. Rawls does not 
take the difference between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium 
to map onto the distinction between an I-morality conception of 
moral theory and some other conception, according to which moral 
theory is not conceived as part of psychology, broadly construed. 
On the contrary, Rawls considers both narrow and wide reflective 
equilibrium to be states of affairs that are achieved in the course of 
"investigating an aspect of human psychology, the structure of our 
moral sensibility."8  By contrast, although Daniels' definitions are 
abstract and faithful to Rawls' own accounts as far as they go—
defining narrow reflective equilibrium as "an ordered pair of (a) a 
set of considered moral judgments acceptable to a given person P 
at a given time, and (b) a set of general moral principles that 
economically systematizes (a),"88 and wide reflective equilibrium 
as an ordered triple of (a), (b), and "(c) the set of relevant theories 
invoked or presupposed by the winning arguments for (b), all duly 
`adjusted' to be compatible with each other,"89—he also takes the 
further unwarranted step of effectively stipulating that the target of 
wide reflective equilibrium is not the human moral sense or sense 
of justice, or indeed any other aspect of human psychology.90 
What Daniels actually produces in his paper, therefore, is neither a 
coherent criticism of the linguistic analogy, nor a coherent 
criticism of the conception of moral theory Rawls actually 
describes in A Theory of Justice, but a terminological sleight of 
hand. Daniels simply redefines narrow and wide reflective 
85 DANIELS, supra note 10, at 79 n.17. 
86 Id. at 66. 
87 Rawls, supra note 9, at 7. 
88 DANIELS, supra note 10, at 67. 
89 hi. at 70. 
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equilibrium in a manner that dissociates the latter from an I-
morality interpretation of moral theory. He then draws on this new 
definition to reject the linguistic analogy, first by arguing that wide 
reflective equilibrium (as he defines it) is at odds with the 
scientific methods of linguistics in various respects, and then by 
concluding, on the foregoing basis, that "the heart of the analogy to 
the case of descriptive syntactics is gone."9I The main effect of all 
this theoretical maneuvering is to obscure a substantive difference 
between Daniels and Rawls over a fundamental issue, namely, the 
proper subject matter of moral theory and the significance of a 
descriptively adequate moral psychology with respect to it. 
Of course Daniels is free to define or redefine technical 
terminology in any way he wants. He is also at liberty to disagree 
with Rawls that the proper subject matter of moral theory is an 
aspect of human psychology. But one would think that he owes it 
to his readers to make clear that this is what he is doing. Instead of 
this, Daniels simply assumes that descriptive adequacy "is not of 
central interest to moral philosophy"92—essentially the same 
strategy of anti-psychologism and avoidance that one finds in Hare 
and Singer—and thereby constructs a mere pseudo-argument 
against the linguistic analogy and its significance for moral 
philosophy. Moreoever, just like Hare and Singer, Daniels 
frequently begs the very questions about the nature and origin of 
human moral intuitions that a research program in moral theory 
inspired by the linguistic analogy is meant to answer in the first 
place.93  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distinction between the problems of descriptive and 
normative adequacy that motivates and informs Rawls' concept of 
reflective equilibrium is a recurring feature of the conception of 
moral theory that can be found in his early writings, including 
Grounds, Outline, A Theory of Justice, and Independence. In 
Grounds and Outline, Rawls adopts the view that there is an order 
of priority between the problem of descriptive adequacy and the 
problem of normative adequacy, the descriptive taking precedence 
over the normative. He also assumes that a solution to the problem 
of descriptive adequacy constitutes a presumptive solution to the 
91 Id. at 72. 
92 Id. at 69. 
43 
 See, e.g., id. at 70-72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol3/iss1/2
2010] 	 RAWLS' CONCEPT OF REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 	 29 
problem of normative adequacy, given the kind of evidence that a 
descriptively adequate set of principles explains.94 In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls' approach to the problem of metaethical 
adequacy—the difficult philosophical question of how moral 
principles can be justified—is more complex. Specifically, as I 
interpret him, Rawls makes at least five major modifications to his 
approach to metaethical adequacy in A Theory of Justice. First, he 
includes the question of how moral knowledge or a sense of justice 
is acquired to be among the fundamental problems that he thinks a 
comprehensive moral theory should solve.95 Second, he introduces 
the contract argument and the notion of pure procedural justice as 
means of showing that the principles of justice as fairness are 
rational. Third, he follows Goodman in defining reflective 
equilibrium in a manner that allows for solutions to the problems 
of empirical and normative adequacy to be mutually dependent. 
Fourth, he makes certain reasonable allowances for the theory-
dependence of the competence–performance distinction, allowing 
that the set of considered judgments can change over time in light 
of empirical inquiry and philosophical reflection. Finally, Rawls 
adopts the weakest of three possible metaethical standpoints 
corresponding to the familiar three-fold distinction among 
discovery, decision, and evaluation procedures that Chomsky 
identifies in Syntactic Structures,96 holding that the overriding goal 
of a moral theory is to construct an evaluation procedure for moral 
principles, rather than seeking to accomplish any more ambitious 
theoretical goal. Consequently Rawls remains satisfied with the 
relatively modest claim that justice as fairness is a better overall 
account of the sense of justice than either utilitarianism or its other 
rivals. As Rawls puts it, his main claim in this regard is that justice 
as fairness is "more reasonable than" any of its rivals, hence it is 
"justifiable with respect to [them]."97 
Brandt, Hare, Singer, and other critics who have objected to 
Rawls' early conception of moral theory on the grounds that it is 
too empirical and insufficiently normative have given no indication 
94 See generally MIKHAIL, supra note 19. 
95 Rawls' concern with the acquisition problem first emerges most clearly in an 
important article published in 1963. See John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 
PHIL. REV. 281 (1963). His reflections on this problem are elaborated at length 
in the third part of A Theory of Justice, particularly Chapter Eight. See RAWLS, 
supra note 1, at 453-512. 
96 On the meaning and significance of Chomsky's three-fold distinction among 
discovery procedures, decision procedures, and evaluation procedures and its 
application to moral theory, see generally Mikhail, Rawls' Linguistic Analogy, 
supra note 19. 
97 RAWLS, supra note I, at 17. 
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in their published writings that they have grasped the full 
complexity of Rawls' approach to the problem of metaethical 
adequacy. Nor, so far as I am aware, have they adequately 
defended a more cogent alternative. For his part, Daniels does not 
defend Rawls' original concept of reflective equilibrium in A 
Theory of Justice as much as reinterpret it in order to change the 
topic, attempting to shift philosophers' attention away from moral 
psychology in the unconvincing manner that has become all-too-
familiar in recent years.98 Rawls' original concept and its 
implications for the complex interaction among descriptive moral 
psychology, normative ethics, and metaethics is subtle, powerful, 
and compelling, and unless and until a more cogent alternative is 
actually produced and shown to be superior to it, his account of 
reflective equilibrium and of the complex interdependence of these 
different branches of ethics in A Theory of Justice would appear to 
be the most defensible account available in the literature. It takes a 
theory to beat a theory.99 As is the case with any scientific or 
philosophical theory, the best a moral theory can hope to achieve is 
to be better than its alternatives. 
98 See generally MIKHAIL, supra note 19. 
" See Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder 
to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L. J. 1435, 1435 (1983) (offering the 
first known use of this familiar phrase in the legal literature). But cf. Thomas S. 
Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 887 n. 47 
(2002) (questioning whether "it takes a theory to beat a theory" accurately 
describes how scientific advances typically occur). For both of these citations, I 
am indebted to Professor Larry Solum, and in particular to the entry on "It Takes 
a Theory to Beat a Theory" in Professor Solum's Legal Theory Lexicon. 
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